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I.

INVESTMENT

INTRODUCTION

The private sector has traditionally become involved in assisting
developing countries through foreign investment.' Until recently,
the United States has relied on unilateral encouragement of private investment in developing countries through its domestic law
and through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC).' The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is an innovative
mechanism for stimulating and protecting United States private
investment in developing nations because the Treaty involves
agreement between the host and home governments.' This bilateral approach may foster foreign investment more effectively than
unilateral methods, thus increasing private sector involvement in
the development effort.
Although the bilateral approach to private foreign investment is
new to the United States, developed nations began to arrange BITs
with the developing world in the late 1970's.4 There are two advantages in not being the first developed nation to sign a BIT. First,
the experience of other countries with BITs can be drawn upon by
United States negotiators in drafting provisions which will meet
the two-pronged goal of investment encouragement and investment protection. Second, because many developing nations alSee infra note 11.
The major encouragement found in domestic law is favorable United States tax treat-

ment afforded foreign enterprises. See generaijy H.

STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 1104-26 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as STEINER & VAGTS]. For a discus-

sion of OPIC, see infra note 60.
' "Host country" refers to the country in which the foreign investment project is located;
"home country" refers to the country of which the investor is a national.
" Bilateral investment treaties were signed as early as 1962, but many more have been
concluded quite recently. About 25 such treaties were negotiated in 1979-80. Asken, The
Case for Bilateral Investment Treaties, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN 1981, 357, 358 (M. Landwehr ed. 1981).
" See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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ready have similar agreements in force, 6 the United States does not
need to introduce an entirely new concept in order to begin negotiating BITs. Those nations which are familiar with such treaties
may be more easily convinced of the merits of investment protection through a bilateral agreement.
This Note discusses the United States efforts in negotiating
BITs through an examination of three documents. First, provisions
in the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Model BIT) of critical
importance to the investor are examined in an effort to expose potential problems and differences between the Model BIT and prior
United States investment protection treaties. Second, the EgyptUnited States BIT (Egyptian BIT) is analyzed in light of relevant
Egyptian law. Third, the Panama-United States BIT (Panamanian
BIT) is examined, and the Panamanian BIT is compared with the
Egyptian BIT. It is hoped that the key elements of interpretation
and the rights that an investor should acquire through implementation of BITs will be illuminated by discussing the varying provisions of the three documents. As the United States concludes more
BITs with developing countries, interpretation of these treaties becomes essential to United States investors planning to establish or
currently operating a project in a nation where a BIT is in force.
Examination of these treaties may even convince potential investors to enter a developing country where the investment law was
previously unclear.7
II.

THE UNITED STATES MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY

In January 1982, the United States Trade Representative for Investment Policy announced the formulation of a Model BIT8 and
the commencement of negotiations toward the conclusion of investment treaties with Egypt and Panama.9 The Model BIT will be
As of 1981, approximately 170 bilateral investment treaties had been concluded between
nations other than the United States. Asken, supra note 4, at 35S.
I The BIT clarifies investment law by providing an understandable legal framework. See
infra note 47 and accompanying text. Thus, it may remove doubts about the law which act
as impediments to potential foreign investment.
• For the text of the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, see Treaty Between the United
States of America and Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments (Jan. 11, 1982), U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 400, at 734 (Mar. 23, 1982)
[hereinafter cited and referred to as Model BIT].
9 Negotiations began with Egypt in December 1980 and with Panama in mid-January
1982. United States Trade Representative Announces New Bilateral Investment Treaty
Model, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 392, at 438, 439 (Jan. 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as BIT Announcement].

1983]

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

the basis for a series of BITs between the United States and developing nations, the primary purpose of which will be to improve the
climate for United States investment in the developing world 0 and
potentially to enhance the private sector's role in development."1
By securing governmental agreement on the treatment that an investor will receive if difficulties concerning his project should arise
and by prescribing a standard of national treatment for investors
in countries Parties" to the treaty, the BIT establishes a legal
framework within which the investor may operate with a higher
degree of confidence.
The basic thrust of the Model BIT is to require that the host
country government accord foreign investment the same treatment
as domestic investment and that any advantages given to thirdparty investment be offered to investors in countries Parties to the
treaty.'" This standard of national treatment is to apply to newly
established investments and associated activities"' and to investments already in place.' 5
In addition to establishing a basic level of treatment, the Model
BIT addresses many specific difficulties that investors typically
face in establishing and operating a project in a developing na'oThe BIT is neither expected nor intended to increase the amount of foreign investment
entering the United States. Countries with which BIT negotiations are to be held are typically too poor to make significant foreign investments. See infra note 114. Since these nations are also recipients of United States foreign aid, increased United States private investment resulting from implementation of the BITs may reduce the pressure for increasing the
amount of foreign aid. United States, Egypt Sign First Treaty on BilateralInvestments, 18
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 16, 17 (Oct. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Egypt and U.S. Sign
BIT].
1 Egypt and U.S. Sign BIT, supra note 10, at 17. Foreign direct investment has traditionally been the principal method of effecting capital and technology transfers from developed to developing countries. Barringer, Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, in 4 LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINEsS TRANSACTIONS 365, 372 (W.
Surrey & D. Wallace 2d ed. 1980). Protections afforded investors under the BIT may increase United States foreign direct investment in the developing world, thereby augmenting
the traditional role of the private sector in the development effort.
" Throughout this Note, "Parties" refers to signatories of one of the treaties when capitalized. When not capitalized, "parties" may refer to other countries or to one signatory and
an investor.
" Model BIT, supra note 8, art. II, paras. 1 & 3, at 735. While there was a great deal of
public concern expressed during the mid-1970's about foreign investment in the United
States, the United States has retained its traditional policy of national treatment of investments within its borders. Note, Host Countries Attitudes Toward Foreign Investment, 3
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 233, 234 (1977). Developing countries, however, have been following a
trend of increasing restrictions on foreign investment. Id. at 243-44.
" Model BIT, supra note 8, art. II, paras. 1 & 3, at 735.
Id. art. II, para. 3, at 735.
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tion.16 The most important difficulties addressed are: 1) conditions
or prerequisites for the establishment and continued operation of
the foreign investor's activities; 2) effects of expropriation; 3)
problems with monetary transfers; and 4) means of settling investment disputes.
Many potential United States investors are concerned by the increasing imposition of "performance requirements" as a condition
of establishing enterprises funded with foreign capital in developing nations. 7 Performance requirements may take the form of export quotas, production quotas, or requirements that supplies be
purchased from the host country's market."8 By imposing these requirements, the developing nation hopes to increase its hard currency reserves and ensure that local industries actively participate
in the foreign investment." The effect of such conditions, however,
is to deter investors from entering a country 0 and, assuming compliance with the conditions, to affect adversely the economy of the
home country. United States government opposition to performance requirements"2 is clearly expressed in the Model BIT, which
" The

Treaty does not provide insurance for investments. See infra notes 58-60 and ac-

companying text.
17 BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439.
18 Bilateral Investment Treaty Stresses Elimination of Performance Requirements, U.S.

EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 400, at 731, 732 (Mar. 23, 1982).
19 BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439.
20 Requirements that supplies be purchased locally may deter investors who wish to import materials from a known supplier or who wish to service the investment project themselves using materials manufactured at another location. The developing country may not
even currently produce the necessary supplies. See infra note 119. Export requirements diminish the attraction of a large domestic market in the developing country.
21 BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439. United States trade officials have complained that performance requirements place undue burdens on foreign investment and
often act as a protectionist trade measure. Id. "These measures tend to 'tilt' the benefits of
foreign investment to the host country at the expense of home or third countries." Katz,
Direct Investment in the United States-Advantages and Barriers, 11 CAsE W. PIs. J.
INT'L L. 473, 482 (1979).
22 The United States policy toward both outgoing and incoming foreign investment
is to
neither encourage nor discourage international investment, and the United States prefers
that market considerations determine the location of investment. This policy calls for implementation of the principle of national treatment with regard to the admission of foreign
capital into a country and subsequent operation of an investment project or other use of the
foreign capital. Performance requirements are diametrically opposed to this principle. Katz,
supra note 21, at 482. The Reagan Administration is formulating a new policy statement on
foreign investment which will place greater emphasis on minimization of investment barriers
than the current neutral position. Government Seeking Bilateral Investment Treaty with
Japan as well as with LDC's, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLv (BNA) 830, 831 (Mar. 1, 1983). Increasing governmental concern over investment barriers has also prompted President Reagan to commence a study of the economic effects of the practice of imposing performance
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forbids imposition of such conditions."3

The Model BIT specifically delineates the rights of an investor
and the duties of the host country in the event of expropriation. 4
Any expropriation, direct or indirect, 5 is disallowed unless it is
done for a public purpose, is under due process of law, is non-discriminatory, and is not violative of any prior contractual agreement between the investor and the expropriating state. 2 The
Model BIT sets forth a requirement for compensation of governmental takings which conforms to the United States standard, i.e.

prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 7 The Model BIT
requirements. White House Requests InternationalStudy of Investment Performance Requirements, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 405, at 113 (Apr. 27, 1982). OPIC, see infra
note 60, has also been directed to refuse to insure any investment subject to performance
requirements which would be detrimental to United States trade benefits. The factors which
OPIC will review include: 1) whether "United States exports to establish or supply a foreign
investment project are displaced by local products because of performance requirements";
2) whether "exports to third country markets originating in the United States are displaced
by exports from the foreign investment because of performance requirements"; and 3)
whether "production from the foreign investment is exported to the United States as a result of performance requirements." A finding of any of these factors will cause OPIC to
refuse to insure or assist in financing the investment. OPIC Official Explains Efforts
Against Investment Requirements, U.S. EXPORT WREKLv (BNA) No. 411, at 370 (June 8,
1982).
" Model BIT, supra note 8, art. II, para. 7, at 735.
Id. art. III, at 736.
" Expropriation may occur as an outright taking of the investor's property by the government; it also can take the form referred to as "creeping" or indirect expropriation. The
latter form may be achieved through taxation and burdensome regulatory measures
designed to render continued operation of the project uneconomical so that it is soon abandoned. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 comment
g & reporter's note 5 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). Examples of indirect expropriation include:
blocking a factory entrance under the guise of maintaining order; setting prohibitive wage
levels; denying entry visas for essential personnel; and imposing restrictive customs, foreign
exchange, or export regulations. Neville, The Present Status of Compensation by Foreign
States for the Taking of Alien-Owned Property, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 52 (1980).
See also Note on Indirect Takings, in STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 2, at 487.
Model BIT, supra note 8, art. III, para. 1, at 736.
17 Id. See Smith, The United States Government Perspective on Expropriationin Developing Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 517, 518 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

187 (1965). This standard is generally

agreed upon by the developed nations as proper compensation for the taking of property
rights from the investor. Developing nations, however, tend to follow a theory which bases
compensation on unjust enrichment. Therefore, these nations may set off excessive profits of
the investment against the compensable value of the alien investor's property. Other factors
considered under the "unjust enrichment" theory of compensation include the contribution
of the enterprise to the economic and social development of the host country, the investor's
respect for labor laws, and the reinvestment policies of the enterprise. Neville, supra note
25, at 67. See also Muller, Compensationfor Nationalization:A North-South Dialogue, 19
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35 (1981).
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further provides that the investor receive the fair market value of
the expropriated investment as measured before announcement of
the expropriation. 8 The compensation "shall be paid without delay, shall be effectively realizeable, shall bear current interest from
the date of the expropriation, and shall be freely transferable
... ,,9 This provision represents the paradigm for the United

States; however, it may be changed during the negotiating process
with some states. 0 Even if some concession has to be made on this
provision, an explicit definition of expropriation, coupled with a
liberal compensation requirement, would constitute a significant
improvement in the legal investment climate of many developing
nations."
The potential foreign investor is necessarily concerned with both
the transferability of funds essential to establishing the investment
project and to purchasing supplies during operation as well as the
transferability of profits.32 The Model BIT binds the Parties to
permit any monetary transfer related to those foreign investments
covered by the Treaty. 8 The exchange rate stipulated is the "marU Model BIT, supra note 8,art. III, para. 1, at 736. The "fair market value" of an expropriated foreign investment may still vary, depending on the method of computation, because
there is usually no actual market available for comparison. There are three basic methods to
derive fair market value. First, the "going-concern" approach attempts to value the property
by measuring earning power; this method renders the highest value and is favored by developed nations. Second, the replacement cost of the property at the time of expropriation, less
actual depreciation, may be employed. Third, the book value, which is the acquisition cost
of the assets less the depreciation taken on the books, is the method of computation favored
by developing countries. This method yields the lowest figure and may bear little relationship to actual value. Smith, supra note 27, at 519.
2 Model BIT, supra note 8, art. III, para. 1, at 736.
U0 United States Trade Representative Harvey Bale stated that the Model BIT represents
the philosophical position of the United States and that some provisions are expected to
change during negotiations. BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439.
31See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). In addition to compensation for expropriation, the
Model BIT accords national treatment to investments of the Parties if the investment
projects are damaged due to war or similar events. Model BIT, supra note 8, art. IV, at 736.
Although the treaty calls for compensation for damage due to war in accordance with the
article on expropriation, id., it is unlikely that such a high level of compensation would be
available in such an event because even nationals of a state are rarely compensated for
damage incurred while the country is at war.
32 Guarantees of access to foreign currency for debt servicing and for meeting
requirements for importing materials used in construction and operation of the foreign plant are
essential to any project. The investor will also seriously consider the consequences of limitations on access to foreign currency for the purpose of the remittance of profits, royalties,
and other fees before deciding where to locate. Barringer, supra note 11, at 372.
3
Model BIT, supra note 8, art. V, para. 1, at 737.

1983]

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

497

. ,', and the invesket rate of exchange on the date of transfer.
tor is entitled to select the currency (or currencies) in which to
transfer unless he has made other arrangements prior to the transaction.35 This provision is designed to provide flexibility and guaranteed liquidity to the investor, but the governmental Parties retain the right to require reports of currency transfers and to
impose withholding taxes.3 6 The Treaty does not specify criteria
concerning the sufficiency of reporting; consequently, the possibility that the Parties could severely hamper currency transfers by
imposing burdensome reporting requirements is not precluded
under the Treaty.37 Some protection against this possibility appears in a separate article which states that formalities prescribed
by the Parties in connection with the establishment of investments
should not impair the substance of the rights set forth in the
Treaty."' This provision could be interpreted to mean that any reporting required by the Parties must not derogate from substantive Treaty rights.8 9
A final issue which the Model BIT addresses is the settlement of
investment disputes.40 The Treaty defines an "investment dispute"
as one which arises between the investor and the host country government. 1 Settlement of disputes between the Parties concerning
the Treaty is dealt with separately.4 The Model BIT provides for
the submission of an investment dispute to negotiation and consul-

"

Id. art. V, para. 2, at 737.

SId.
Id. art. V, para. 3, at 737.
W Time-consuming

bureaucratic bottlenecks are a major legal issue for the investor to
consider when entering a developing country. Barringer, supra note 11, at 370. The ultimate
effect of extremely burdensome requirements may be indirect, "creeping" expropriation. See
supra note 25.
" Model BIT, supra note 8,art. X, para. 2, at 739.
" The rights of the Parties under the Treaty must be exercised in accordance with the
good faith standard of international law. Therefore, if reporting requirements for currency
transfers hamper the goals of the Treaty, the requirements could be considered a violation
of the Treaty under principles of international law. RESTATEMENr OF THE FOREIGN RmwATIONS LAW OF THE UirrMa STATES § 324 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
0 Model BIT, supra note 8,art. VII, at 737.
41 Id.

,2Id. art. VIII, at 738. Disputes between the Parties are to be resolved through diplomatic channels, if possible; otherwise, the dispute will be submitted to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) if the Parties agree to such submission. If the Parties do not agree to
submit the dispute to the ICJ, the Model BIT details an arbitration procedure which may
be used. Rules and principles of international law are to apply to disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaty if the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal is called upon.
Id.
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tation; if these methods fail, the parties to the dispute may then
employ settlement procedures to which they have previously
agreed."s If these efforts are unsuccessful, the parties may employ
the procedures for conciliation or binding arbitration available
through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID)."4 The provision allowing the investor a right to
settle disputes directly with the host country government is impor-

tant because it adds to the effectiveness of the Treaty's imposition
of obligations on governments and because it permits a foreign investor to use objective third-party dispute settlement mechanisms
rather than those of the host country when pursuing his claim.4 '
Affording the investor this right also alleviates the fear that his
home country will decline espousal of the claim on his behalf at

the international level."
If ratified as written, the Model BIT would provide a legal
framework within which the rights of the foreign investor are
Id. art. VII, para. 2, at 737.
Id. art. VII, para. 3, at 738. The ICSID has been in operation since 1966. As of 1979,
nine requests for arbitration proceedings had been registered; out of six instances in which
an arbitration tribunal had been formed, dispute resolution was achieved in five. Sutherland, The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 28 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 367, 398 (1979). In light of its record, the ICSID affords a forum in which the
private foreign investor has direct access to the government in the event of a dispute. Furthermore, "the Centre itself believes that the very existence of binding arbitration arrangements acts as a powerful incentive for the amicable settlement of investment disputes as
they arise." Id. at 399. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES § 713 reporter's note (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982).
- Some developing countries adhere to the principle that an alien may only use locally
available remedies to pursue claims. This principle may pose considerable difficulty in the
attempt to procure agreement to the dispute settlement provisions. See infra notes 140-41
and accompanying text.
4
Typically, a private investor must initially seek redress through local remedies; according to a basic tenet of international law, a government cannot assert an international claim
on behalf of one of its nationals until local remedies have been exhausted. Brower, International Legal Protectionof United States Investment Abroad, in 3 LAWYER'S GUIDE TO IN42

4

TERNATIONAL

BusinEss

TRANSACTIONS,

folio 6, at 40 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace 2d ed. 1981).

After local remedies have been exhausted, the investor may request that his own government assist him in resolving the dispute. This assistance is a customary activity of the
United States government and typically consists of a statement to the host government relating the United States position on an acceptable resolution of the matter. Formal "espousal" consists of the state's asserting its national's claim as the state's own. Unfortunately, this process may be of little benefit to the investor because he loses legal control over
his claim since the government decides how much to accept in settlement. In deciding
whether to espouse a claim, the United States Department of State weighs a number of
factors and is not required to take action. Id. at 64-69. Therefore, unless the investor provides protection for himself, see infra note 58, or obtains relief through local remedies, he
may have no redress for injury suffered in another country.

1983]

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

clearly outlined.4 7 The Treaty would not significantly affect current
United States policy toward incoming investment" since it is not
likely to increase the amount of investment capital entering the
United States. 49 While the title of the Treaty is "Reciprocal En-

couragement and Protection of Investments,"" and while there is
no difference between the obligations of the United States and
those of the other Party, the developing countries with whom these
treaties will be signed do not have at present the economic capacity to invest significant amounts of capital in the United States.5
Foreign investment has a positive impact on the home and host
country economies."' The United States interest therefore lies in
protecting its investments abroad.53 Although the United States
has long used treaties to provide investment protection, most prior
agreements of this nature were concluded with industrialized nations." Thus, the BIT format is innovative not only because it is
designed to accomodate the interests of developing countries, but
47 Barovick, Bilateral Investment Treaties:Ensuring Fair Treatment for United States
Investors in the Third World, 5 Bus. Am.3 (Aug. 23, 1982).
" The United States position on foreign investment is outlined supra note 22. The reciprocity principle of the BIT is not expected to affect current protections afforded the foreign investor in the United States. BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439.
"BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439.
Model BIT, supra note 8, at 734 (emphasis added). The preamble is also couched in
terms of reciprocity. Id.
*lSee, e.g., infra note 114.
" Positive effects on the home country economy include the domestic supply linkage,
sales to those foreign markets which are unreachable through exports, stimulation of additional exports through foreign affliates, and production of income which may be repatriated. Major host country benefits are increased capital and employment and, in the developing world, assistance in modernization and growth. Connor, Wanted: A Fair Shake for
United States Investors Abroad, 26 PIUCs WAruRHousz Rav. 3, 4 (Nov. 1, 1982). Although
the economic benefits of foreign investment are documented, there are many socio-political
arguments in opposition to foreign investment. These arguments are often aimed at the
activities of large multinational enterprises. See generally, Note on the MNE as Hero or
Villain: PoliticalPerspectives, in STeam & VAGTs, supra note 2, at 1179. In particular,

Latin American countries tend to view private investment as the result of corporate interest
in profits rather than the welfare of the host nation. Administration Set to Unveil Caribbean Basin Initiative, U.S. ExPor WEExLY (BNA) No. 392, at 433, 434 (Jan. 26, 1982).
" In addition to the home country benefits, see supra note 52, increased private investment may benefit the United States by reducing demands for additional foreign aid. See
supra note 10. Protection of private investment abroad also serves the United States policy
of allowing market, rather than political, considerations to determine the location of investments. See supra note 22.
" Brower, supra note 46, at 10. The United States had not only concluded very few
agreements of this nature with developing nations, it also had not signed any investment
protection treaty since 1968. Therefore, the United States was ready for new treaties, like
the BIT, which are designed to meet modern investment needs. Asken, supra note 4, at 364.
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also because it focuses on investment of foreign capital. 55 In contrast, the traditional Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation cover a broad range of other topics, such as shipping rights,
export-import privileges, and taxation." The investor's ability to
hold the host country to its treaty obligations under the dispute
settlement mechanisms of the Model BIT constitutes another departure from previous United States investment agreements,
thereby providing a greater degree of investment protection 5to7 the
investor than was previously available under earlier treaties.
Although investors have other avenues available to protect investment abroad," a BIT represents governmental commitment to
provide fair treatment to foreign investors in the country where it
is in force. 5' Unlike agreements between the United States and developing nations under the auspices of OPIC, 60 the BIT does not
Although the focus of the BIT is an innovation for the United States, other developed
nations have already negotiated bilateral investment treaties focusing exclusively on protection of their investment capital in developing nations. Many of the treaties to which the
United States is not a party are listed in Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to which the
United States is not a Party, 21 I.L.M. 1208 (1982). See also supra note 6.
"Although not solely concerned with investment, the more modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN treaties), i.e. those signed after World War II, contain a number of useful provisions for private foreign investors concerning matters such as
expropriation, foreign exchange convertibility, and access to local courts. Brower, supra note
46, at 9-12.
'1 Fqr the Model BIT dispute settlement scheme, see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. While the more modern FCN treaties typically provide that disputes arising under
them will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, Brower, supra note 46, at 12, the Model
BIT provision allows the investor to pursue claims personally, without exhausting local remedies or attempting to procure an espousal from the home state government. See supra note
46.
" A United States foreign investor may obtain insurance from OPIC, if available. See
infra note 60. The United States Export-Import Bank offers advance protection against
losses incurred by exporters, a service which may be valuable to a foreign investor whose
project entails substantial export of materials and supplies from the United States. Brower,
supra note 46, at 20-21. The investor may also attempt to procure agreement to a protective
contract from the host country government or from his local partner. The contract may
include a clause applying law other than that of the host country to the parties' relations
and may provide for use of arbitration or a forum other than the host country to settle
disputes. Id. at 29-30.
" Barovick, supra note 47, at 3.
"OPIC is a semi-autonomous agency of the United States government which provides
insurance to United States corporations against the risks of investing abroad. Neville, supra
note 25, at 53 n.6. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1976). OPIC may insure investments for a
maximum period of 20 years in countries entering into a bilateral "umbrella" agreement
with the United States which provides general approval of the OPIC program and limited
protections. Currently, over 80 countries have entered these agreements and are thus eligible for OPIC-insured investments. Brower, supra note 46, at 14-15. See, e.g., Egypt-United
States Investment Guarantee Agreement, July 16, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 1257 (1974).
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afford insurance for the investor; rather, it outlines his legal rights.
While the BIT is essentially a practical document, highly advantageous to a potential investor, it is not the exclusive form of protection on which the investor should rely."1 No treaty can make absolute assurances that the rights conferred by that treaty will
withstand political insurrections or inherent political or economic
instability. 2
III.

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT-UNITED STATES BILATERAL

INVESTMENT TREATY

The first nation to negotiate and sign a BIT with the United
States was the Arab Republic of Egypt. 8 Egypt was a logical nation to target for the first United States BIT because of its strategic importance,6 its favorable attitude toward foreign investOPIC may go beyond merely insuring an investor; it may become an active party in the
settlement of investment disputes. Five specific examples of OPIC's involvement in dispute
settlement are discussed in Gilbert, Enforceability of Foreign Investment Disputes, 17 VA.
J. INT'L L. 361 (1977).
" The investor should utilize as many self-protective devices as possible. See supra note
58. Obtaining OPIC insurance, if available, is especially important. See supra note 60.
" While the question of whether a "fundamental change of circumstances" is grounds for
termination of a treaty under international law has not been conclusively determined, political changes may undoubtedly affect the enforceability of a treaty. See STEINER & VAGTS,
supra note 2, at 287-89. An example of such a situation with respect to an FCN treaty, see
supra note 56, is the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15,
1955, Iran-United States, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93.
Special problems may be presented in Latin America because its nations adhere to a concept of sovereignty under which the "state" typically is identified as the government in
power; thus, succeeding governments do not feel compelled to honor their predecessors'
commitments. Helander, Legal Framework for Foreign Investment in Latin America, in 4
LAwYER's GUIDE TO INTNATIONAL BusiNEss TRANSACTIONs 223, 242 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace, 2d ed. 1980).
" Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept.
29, 1982, Egypt-United States, -- U.S.T. -- , T.I.A.S. No. -- , reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 927
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Egyptian BIT]. The Treaty negotiations lasted a little over a
year.
Negotiations on the BIT began before the assassination of Sadat and were interrupted by
his death. BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439. Due to Egypt's smooth governmental
transition and President Hosne Mubarak's decision to follow many of Sadat's economic policies, negotiations resumed promptly and were quickly concluded. The new government feels
that Sadat's assassination was not damaging to Egypt's attractiveness as a favorable nation
in which to invest. To the contrary, it is believed that the smooth transition of power is
perceived as evidence of the stable political climate. Egypt Will Attempt to Redirect its
Foreign Private Investment, U.S. EXPORT WmEKLV (BNA) No. 394, at 521 (Feb. 9, 1982).
Stability in Egypt has obvious repercussions for stability throughout the Middle East.
Since the early 1970's, the United States has tried to assist Egyptian development, presumably for strategic as well as humanitarian reasons. See Hostler, The Contribution of the
United States to Egyptian Development, 30 MmDLE E.J. 539 (1976). BITs will be negoti-
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ment,as and the substantial amount of United States private
investment already in place.66
Since 1974, Egypt has followed an "open door" policy regarding
incoming foreign investment.6 7 This policy was embodied in Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974,68 which provided for the General Author-

ity for Investment and Free Zones (Authority) to oversee foreign
investments and to give a package of governmental protections and
incentives to those foreign-funded projects approved by it."' Even
after enactment of this law, however, significant impediments to
foreign private investment in Egypt remained, including the foreign exchange rate structure, the difficulty of transferring profits
from a foreign-owned project, the inadequate availability of foreign
currency, barriers to profit reinvestment, bars to capital repatriation, and disadvantageous taxation. 0 Incentives under Law No. 43
were not available to all foreign projects, but only for those approved by the Authority,7 1 whose vague criteria for approval ofated with Caribbean nations primarily because the economies of those nations are viewed as
strategically important. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. The purpose underlying the Caribbean negotiations further supports the relevance of this factor in the United
States determination of countries with which to negotiate BITs.
See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
At the end of 1981, United States investment in Egypt was in excess of one billion
dollars. Egypt and U.S. Sign BIT, supra note 10, at 16.
07 R. DiuscoLL, P.F. HAYEK, & F. ZAKI, FOREIGN INvESTMENT IN EGYPT. AN ANALYSIS OF
CRITICAL FACTORS wrrH EMPHASIS ON THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE 9-10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DRISCOLL]. Even prior to the implementation of this policy, Egyptian law was
not entirely adverse to foreign investment. Id. at 5. See also Abdel-Meguid, Egypt's Policy
Towards Foreign Investment, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 97 (1977).
" Law No. 43 of 1974 concerning the Investment of Arab and Foreign Funds and Free
Zones, Egypt, OFFICIAL G'zrE (Jarida Rasmia), 1974, (Egyptian Embassy trans.) no. 26,
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 1500 (1974). Law No. 43 replaced the prior, less satisfactory investment scheme under Law No. 65 of 1971. Note, The Development of Foreign Investment
Law in Egypt and its Effect on PrivateForeignInvestment, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.L. 301,
303 (1980). See Law No. 65 of 1971, Egypt, OFFICIAL GAzzErrE (Jarida Rasmia), Sept. 30,

1971. For a concise discussion of the investment incentives offered under Law No. 43 of
1974, see Dempsey, Foreign Investment Incentives in the Developing World: The Legislation of Greece, Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand,and the Republic of China, 11 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 575, 586-94 (1979). At the time, Law No. 43 "constitute[d] the most comprehensive
legal document ever enacted with respect to foreign investment." DRISCOLL, supra note 67,
at 10.
08 Law No. 43 of 1974, ch. 1, art. 1, 13 I.L.M. at 1501. The incentives are granted to
promote selected industries and sectors deemed important for the economic development of
the country. El Nazer, The Legal Framework of Foreign Investment in Egypt, 11 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 613, 614 (1979).
70 DRISCOLL, supra note 67, at 24-26. For additional analysis of the problems posed for the
investor by the original Law No. 43, see Note, supra note 68, at 304-06.
"' Law No. 43 of 1974, supra note 68, ch. 1, art. 1, 13 I.L.M. at 1501.
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fered little guidance to Egypt's potential foreign investors. 72 Furthermore, in its original form, Law No. 43 tended to discourage
joint ventures with the Egyptian private sector because its incen-

tives and guarantees applied solely to the foreign investor and not
to his Egyptian partner.73
Many of these problems were alleviated through a major revision
of Law No. 43 by Law No. 32 of 1977. 74 Although reasonably
favorable to foreign investment subsequent to this revision 7
Egyptian law retained a dichotomy in the treatment accorded to
projects funded with foreign capital by granting more favorable
treatment to those projects which were specifically designed to
produce goods for export than to those designed to supply the local
market. 76 Such discriminatory treatment is similar to the perform-

ance requirements which the United States Model BIT aims at
eliminating, 7 and the existence of this dichotomy may have been
one of the factors stimulating the negotiations between the United
7'

Note, supra note 68, at 304.

78 DmiscoLL, supra note 67, at 27. Foreign investors do not seek joint ventures with the

public sector because they tend to view the Egyptian public sector as a competitor. Id. at 31.
Thus, a joint venture with the private sector is a mutually satisfactory mode of assuring
local participation in foreign investment projects. Id. at 27.
7' Law No. 32 of 1977, Egypt, OFFIcIAL GAZZrTT (Jarida Rasmia), June 9, 1977. The
amendments are included in the English translation of Law No. 43 in DRiSCoLL, supra note
67, at 59-86. The operation of Law No. 43 as amended is detailed in Note, supra note 68, at
306-23. The general fields of foreign investment in which projects funded with foreign capital are now encouraged under Law No. 43 are: industrialization, mining, energy, tourism,
transportation, and other related activities; the reclamation and cultivation of barren land;
the development of animal and water resources; construction activities in regions outside
the agricultural area and existing cities; construction contracting in which Egyptian capital
holds at least a 50% interest; joint venture technical consultant activities; investment banks,
investment companies, commercial banks, and reinsurance companies whose activities are
limited to transactions in free foreign currencies; and banks engaged in local currency transactions, provided that they take the form of a joint venture in which Egyptian capital holds
at least a 51% interest. El Nazer, supra note 69, at 615-16.
7' Note, supra note 68, at 323-24.
7, Id. at 308. This dichotomy was more of a problem before Law No. 43 was amended.
The original Law No. 43 did not encourage investment by the majority of foreign companies
who were interested in production for the large inland market rather than for export. Id. at
304-05.
" For a discussion of performance requirements and the United States position, see
supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. Discriminatory incentive laws do not preclude
establishment of foreign enterprises which fail to meet requirements for incentives and are
not, therefore, as detrimental to foreign investment as actual performance requirements.
However, the United States International Trade Commission's study of performance requirements entails an investigation of incentives which are tied to performance criteria, thus
indicating that the United States is concerned about such discriminatory laws. White House
Requests InternationalStudy of Investment Performance Requirements, supra note 22, at
114.
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States and Egypt. However, it is most likely that the overall
favorable investment framework of Egyptian law constituted the
major factor; the United States probably felt that agreement with
Egypt could be reached quite smoothly because of Egypt's advantageous investment climate. Furthermore, by entering into the first
BIT quickly, the groundwork would be laid for later, more difficult
negotiations with developing nations which either have no investment scheme or are antagonistic to foreign investment.78
In most respects, the Egyptian BIT closely parallels the United
States prototype; however, the Egyptian Treaty does not impose
an absolute bar on performance requirements. 7 s The agreement
with Egypt only states that the Parties "seek to avoid" such conditions for establishment.8 0 Egypt has bilateral investment treaties
mandating most-favored-nation treatment of investments with
other countries.81 If the Model BIT's clause were adopted, Egypt
could not have imposed performance requirements on third-party
investments made by countries under those bilateral investment
treaties. 81
The clause in the Egyptian BIT concerning expropriation is
identical to that contained in the Model BIT, including reference
to the liberal compensation standard.88 This is not surprising since
Egyptian law recognizes the state's duty to compensate for a gov79 Another reason that Egypt was a prime candidate for the first United States BIT is
Egypt's prior experience with similar agreements. Egypt currently has bilateral investment
treaties in force with nine nations and has signed five others. Recent Actions Regarding
Treaties to Which the United States is not a Party, 21 I.L.M. 1208 (1982).
"Compare Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. II, para. 7, at 933 with Model BIT, supra
note 8, art. II, pars. 7, at 735. An absolute bar on performance requirements would have
been highly valued by the United States. See supra notes 21-22.
" Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. II, pars. 7, at 933.
81 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 11, 1975,
Egypt-United Kingdom, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1470 (1975). "Neither Contracting Party
shall in its territory subject investments or companies of the other Contracting Party to
treatment less favourable than that which it accords to investments or returns of its own
nationals or companies or to investments or returns of nationals or companies of any third
state." Id. art. 3, pars. 1, 14 I.L.M. at 1470 (emphasis added).
" Egypt's bilateral investment treaties with nations other than the United States typically do not contain clauses which prohibit the imposition of performance requirements. If
Egypt had, however, consented to such a prohibition in its agreement with the United
States, the prohibition could have been enforced by parties to the earlier treaties under a
clause such as the one contained in the Egypt-United Kingdom Agreement. See supra note
81.
" Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. III, at 934. For discussion of the Model BIT provision, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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ernmental taking of property." Moreover, a previously concluded
bilateral investment treaty between Egypt and the United Kingdom contains a similar provision."0
While the monetary transfers article of the Egyptian BIT is substantially the same as the Model BIT article," the protocol to the
Egyptian Treaty explicitly recognizes the problem of insufficient
currency reserves faced by the Egyptian government.8 7 Due to that
problem, Egypt is permitted to delay United States investors from
transferring funds in order to prevent a currency shortage.88
Disputes between an investor and the host government may be
resolved within a framework similar to that set forth in the Model
BIT. Since Egypt has ratified the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States,89 the wording of the dispute settlement procedure 0 differs
slightly from the Model BIT, which contains an alternative provi"Since 1974, foreign investments to which Law No. 43 is applicable have been protected
from nationalization without judicial procedures. Law No. 43 of 1974, supra note 68, ch. 1,
art. VII, 13 I.L.M. at 1502. The Egyptian Constitution also prohibits nationalizations except
in "cases of public interest and only by means of law and against a fair compensation." ALDUsTOR AL-MIsR1 (Egyptian Constitution), art. 35 (1972) (D. Heller trans.).
" Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note 81, art. 5, at
1471-72.
Compare Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. V, at 937 with Model BIT, supra note 8,
art. V, at 737.
" Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, protocol, para. 6, at 948. Bilateral aid from the United
States and funds from the Arab states have been used to help Egypt bolster its exchange
reserves when shortages arise. Abdel-Meguid, aupra note 67, at 106.
" Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, protocol, para. 6, at 948. This is prevented from becoming a "bureaucratic bottleneck," see supra note 37, by restriction of permissible delays. The
Egyptian government may delay monetary transfers only(i) in a manner not less favorable than that accorded to comparable transfers of
investors of third countries;
(ii) to the extent and for the time period necessary to restore its [foreign currency] reserves to a minimally acceptable level ... ; and
(iii) after providing the investor an opportunity to invest the sales or liquidation
proceeds in a manner which will preserve their real value free of exchange risk
until transfer occurs.
Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, protocol, para. 6, at 948.
17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. For the states which have signed and/or ratified the Convention, see Brower, supra
note 46, at 35 n.139. Egypt codified ratification of the Convention in Law No. 90 of 1971.
DmscoLL, supra note 67, at 8. The Convention established an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) which is available for conciliation and arbitration
of investment disputes between nationals of states which are members of the Convention
and the governments of other member states. Convention, supra, art. I, 17 U.S.T. at 1273,
575 U.N.T.S. at 162.
Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. VII, at 939.
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sion for states not parties to the Convention." The right to use
third-party procedures to settle investment disputes is an important provision for investors because they might otherwise be lim-

ited to remedies of local law."
The primary emphasis in the Egyptian BIT is substantially
equivalent to that in the Model BIT.'8 Egypt's BIT accords national or most-favored-nation

treatment,

whichever is more

favorable, to the foreign investments and associated activities of
each Party." Both Parties, however, are given the right to exempt
certain industries and activities from the national treatment stan-

dard."5 The annex lists sectors of the economy in which the Parties
maintain this right." The Egyptian BIT specifies the procedure
which a Party must follow to make an exception in a listed sector. 97 Egypt has reserved the right to make exceptions in a broad
spectrum of possible investment areas." The current government

of Egypt favors increased investment in industrial production, and
no right to make an exception was reserved in that area." The

United States has listed sectors of the economy in which foreign
ownership is currently regulated to some extent, 0 0 basically, secur-

91 Model BIT, supra note 8, art. VII, at 737.

" See supra note 46. Egyptian law entitles foreign investors to use the dispute resolution
mechanisms of the Convention, supra note 89, if their project is approved by the General
Authority for Investment and the Free Zones. Law No. 43 of 1974, supra note 68, ch. 1, art.
8, 13 I.L.M. at 1502. The Egyptian BIT extends this privilege to all United States investors
in Egypt. Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. VII, at 939.
"For a discussion of the thrust of the Model BIT, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
" Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. H, at 930.
" Id. art. H, para. 3, at 932.
Id. annex, at 946.
"Id. art. H, para. 3, at 932.
Egypt reserved the right to make exceptions in the following sectors: air and sea transportation; land transportation; mail, telecommunication, and telegraph services; banking
and insurance; distribution, wholesaling, retailing, and import and export activities; commercial agency and broker activities; ownership of real estate; use of land and natural resources; national loans; radio, television, and issuance of newspapers and magazines. Id. annex, at 946.
9 President Mubarak has stressed the need for "productive" foreign investments and has
supported the "open door" toward industrial production. McQueen, Egypt: Growing Economy Attracts Horde of U.S. Companies, 5 Bus. Am.31 (Feb. 8, 1982). He has indicated,
however, that the attempt to channel foreign capital into heavy industry rather than into
consumer goods would take the form of incentives rather than restrictions. Egypt Will Attempt to Redirect its Foreign Private Investment, supra note 63, at 521.
100 See generally Note On FederalControl Over Economic Activity of Aliens, in STEINmR
& VAGTS, supra note 2, at 58.
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ity-related fields.101 The right to make exceptions should not detract from the viability of the Treaty because the Parties have
agreed to hold such exceptions to a minimum and because, even if
an exception from national treatment is made, treatment accorded
foreign investments thereby excluded must be on a most-favorednation basis.'0m
IV. Tmi

REPUBLIC OF PANAMA-UNITED STATES BILATERAL

INVESTMENT TREATY

A program aimed at establishing BITs is one element of the mul-

tifaceted Caribbean Basin Initiative (Initiative) launched last year
by the Reagan Administration.10 The Initiative was developed in
response to severe economic problems and the consequential threat
to political and social stability in the Caribbean, an area of strategic and economic importance to the United States.' 0 ' Although the
Model BIT will provide the basis for negotiating treaties with developing countries in Asia and Africa as well as in Latin America,
current plans call for implementing the largest number of BITs
with Caribbean and Central American nations. 08 The BIT program will be integrated into the economic assistance scheme of the
Initiative.'"e

Panama, the second country to sign a BIT with the United
States, is one of the states targeted in the Caribbean Basin Initiative.1° 7 The Panamanian BIT was signed one month after negotiations with Egypt were completed.les
1*1Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, annex, at 946. These restrictions include: air and maritime transport; banking; insurance; government grant, insurance, and loan programs; energy
and power production; use of natural resources; customs brokers; ownership of real estate;
radio, satellite, television, telephone, and telegraph communications; and submarine cable
services. Id.
o Id. art. II, para. 3, at 932.
'o' See BuREAU OF PuBLic AFFAuRS, U.S. DKP'T OF STATE SPEcIAL ReP. No. 97, BACKGROUND ON Tm CA=Easw4 BAsra ImNTIATm 5 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND
REPORT].
Io Id. at 1.
101 BIT Announcement, supra note 9, at 439.
104 One-way free trade, special United States tax incentives for investment, increased foreign aid, and expanded availability of investment insurance are all part of the economic
assistance package which is to comprise the Caribbean Basin Initiative. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 103, at 1-2.
See id. at 3 (map and statistics on targeted Caribbean states).
, Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, Oct. 27, 1982, Panama-United States, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1227 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Panamanian BIT].

508

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 13:491

Panamanian law concerning incoming private foreign investment

is not as detailed and does not provide as many incentives as
Egyptian law. "" However, foreign investment is encouraged, and
some incentives do exist.110 Panama does not specifically preclude
foreign investment from primary industrial sectors, although foreigners may not engage in the local retail trade. "' In addition,
Panamanian law restricts the employment of aliens. With the exception of technicians and other specialists, ninety per cent of the
work force of foreign-owned firms must be composed of Panamanian nationals or their spouses."' Land ownership less than ten
kilometers from the borders is also restricted to Panamanian
nationals. 1 8
The Panamanian Treaty follows the Model BIT format. Al-

though the word "encouragement" does not appear in the title of
the Treaty, it is designed to stimulate United States investment in
Panama '4 by providing protection and favorable treatment. A national treatment standard for foreign investment and associated'
activities is prescribed;"' thus, the primary emphasis in the Pana-

manian BIT is the same as that in the Egyptian BIT." '
While the purposes are congruent, the Panamanian and Egyptian BITs differ in several material respects. Unlike the Egyptian
BIT, the Panamanian BIT places an absolute ban on the imposi," Many other Latin American countries have a single law containing a comprehensive
investment scheme. Panamanian law concerning foreign investment, however, must be garnered from various provisions of Panama's domestic law. Juncadella, The Foreign Investment Laws of Latin America: Present and Future, 16 INT'L LAw. 463, 465 (1982).
'" PRICE WATERHOUSE, INFORMATION GUIE: DOING Busmss IN PANAMA 11 (non-tax incentives such as information seryices and the Col6n Free Trade Zone) and 45 (tax incentives, such as concessions on import and export duties) (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as
DOING Busums IN PANAMA].
"I Id. at 7. See CoNsTrruCION DR LA REPUBLICA DR PANAMA, art. 252 (G.Flanz trans.).
I" DOING BUSINESS IN PANAMA, supra note 110, at 25. Even foreign specialists and technicians are limited to 15% of the total number of a firm's employees. However, a five-year
exemption from this ceiling may be obtained from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Id.
", "Foreign natural or juridical persons and national juridical persons having foreign capital in whole or in part may not acquire ownership of land situated less than ten kilometers
from the borders." CONSTrrUCION DE LA REPUBLICA PANAMA, art. 250 (G. Flanz trans.).
""The need for private sector assistance through foreign investment in Panama is evident from that nation's poverty. Panama's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is only $3,511
million, its exports to the United States amount to a mere $262 million, and its population
is under two million. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 103, at 3.
In fiscal year 1977, Egypt's GDP was $12 billion; however, per capita income was only
$280. 1 COUNTRmS OF THE WORLD AND THEm LEADERS 446 (1982).
115 Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. H, para. 1, at 1229.
"
See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.

1983]

509

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

tion of performance requirements.' 1 7 Neither Party to the Panamanian BIT may condition the establishment of investments of the
other Party on export requirements, local purchase of supplies requirements, or any similar requirement. ' This difference seems
unusual in light of Panama's tax incentives for foreign investment
since these incentives are designed to promote exports. 11' In this
respect, the tax incentives are similar to performance requirements, as are the Egyptian tax incentive laws.12 0 Furthermore, as
in Egypt, Panama's balance-of-payments is a major governmental
concern,1 2 1 and developing countries often impose performance re-

quirements specifically to alleviate this problem. 12 2 This is Panama's first BIT, however, and Panama thus remains free to impose
performance requirements on investments from countries other
12
than the United States.

Panama's BIT proscribes direct or indirect expropriation in the
same way as the Egyptian BIT.1 2 Compensation for lawful expro-

priation is to be "prompt, adequate, and effective.

1 28

Panama

made a major concession to the United States in adopting this
compensation standard because Panama is a traditional Calvo
11
Compare Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. II, para. 4, at 1230-31, with Egyptian
BIT, supra note 63, art. II, para. 7, at 933. For a discussion of the Egyptian provision concerning performance requirements, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
118Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. II, para. 4, at 1231.
"9 Panama'a Cabinet Decree No. 413 of December 1970, as modified by Cabinet Decree
No. 172 of August 1971, provides for exemption from import duties on a number of items
used in industry and for a total exemption of income tax on profits for firms which export
products manufactured in Panama. DOING BusNmss IN PANAMA, supra note 110, at 47. Nontraditional products manufactured in Panama and subsequently exported entitle the investor to additional tax credit in the form of certificates used to pay other taxes. Id. The bar on
performance requirements contained in the Panamanian Treaty supports the Reagan Administration's view that poorer countries such as those in the Caribbean region lack the
infrastructure to pursue such requirements. White House Requests InternationalStudy of
Investment Performance Requirements, supra note 22, at 114.
"' See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Ill Panama has relied heavily upon international loans to finance net deficits in its balance of payments. DOING BusINEss IN PANAMA, supra note 110, at 6.
"I See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Panama is not concerned with maintaining
adequate hard currency reserves. See infra note 131. Maintaining adequate reserves is the
primary reason that other developing countries feel compelled to impose performance
requirements.
18 Compare the Panamanian position on performance requirements with that of Egypt,
discussed supra note 82 and accompanying text.
21 For a discussion of indirect expropriation, see supra note 28; see also Panamanian
BIT, supra note 108, art. IV, at 1231-32. The Egyptian expropriation provision is discussed
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
118 Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. IV, para. 1 at 1231.
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Monetary transfers do not pose a problem in Panama because
Panama has neither exchange controls'" nor its own currency.""'
Thus, the transfers provision merely obliges the Parties to keep
currency and capital transactions unrestricted.", This treatment of
monetary transfers differs from the explicit provision concerning
transfers contained in the Egyptian BIT;1" 0 Egyptian exchange
controls and periodic lack of adequate hard currency mandated
greater specificity.131
The two Treaties also differ in the way in which they deal with
aliens employed by foreign firms. 3 2 Although the Panamanian BIT
does permit employment of aliens in top managerial positions, certain domestic employment laws restricting the opportunity for
foreign firms to employ aliens are specifically noted.133 Panama's
uncharacteristic agreement to allow any alien employment is also
limited by the laws regarding the entry and sojourn of aliens.134 In
contrast, the Egyptian BIT does not specify laws which may restrict alien employment by foreign firms. "
'" For a discussion of the Calvo Doctrine, see infra note 140 and accompanying text. The
concession is also unusual because disputes between United States investors and Panama
have obstructed ratification of the Treaty. See infra note 141.
1 Juncadella, supra note 109, at 466.
I" Panama uses the United States dollar as its circulating currency. Law No. 84 of 1904
granted legal circulation to the dollar in Panama. DOING BusiNESS IN PANAMA, supra note
110, at 13.
12 Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. VI, at 1232.
180 Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. V, at 937.
181 See supra notes 86-88. Panama does not own official foreign exchange reserves because

it has not issued paper currency. DoING BuSINEss IN PANAMA, supra note 110, at 13.
'*" The Panamanian Treaty sets out the subject of alien employment in a separate article,
thus heightening the emphasis of this provision. Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. III,
at 1231. The Egyptian Treaty incorporates the topic in a paragraph of an article. Egyptian
BIT, supra note 63, art. II, para. 5, at 933.
18 Panamanian BIT, aupra note 108, Agreed Minutes, para. 3, at 1242.
'8 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The Panamanian Treaty explains in detail
the type of laws to which the restriction refers: regulations of the terms and conditions of
employment; equal opportunity laws; preferential hiring laws; anti-discrimination laws; and
laws relating to the training of local employees in order to qualify for all professional, technical, and managerial positions. The Parties have agreed to flexibly administer "laws requiring employment of [a Party's] own nationals in certain positions or the employment of a
certain percentage of its own nationals in positions in connection with investment made in
its territory by nationals or companies of the other Party." Panamanian BIT, supra note
108, Agreed Minutes, pars. 3, at 1242-43.
18 The Egyptian provision merely states that, subject to laws relating to the entry and
sojourn of aliens, nationals of the Parties will be permitted to enter the territory of the
other Party in connection with investments. Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, art. II, para. 5, at
933. Egypt has some requirements for employment of nationals, but these can be eased
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One difference between the Panamanian and Egyptian BITs
which at first appears significant is in the definition of a "company
of a Party." The Panamanian Treaty defines this as one "incorporated under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party in which
...
nationals... or such Party... have a substantial interest as
determined by such Party" (emphasis added).158 The Egyptian
BIT defines "substantial interest" to mean "such extent of interest
as to permit the exercise of control or significant influence on the
company" and provides for the Parties to consult where they differ
as to the existence of substantial interest.3 7 Providing for unilat-

eral definition of "substantial interest" may prove risky to the investor in Panama, especially in view of conflicting definitions of
corporate nationality in international law.'" The significance of
this risk is somewhat diminished because, even if Panama chose to
determine that a company incorporated in Panama, but in which
United States nationals owned the majority of stock, is to be considered a Panamanian corporation, the United States stockholders
would still be entitled to protection of their "investment" under a
separate provision.18 9
That corporate nationality is to some extent unilaterally determinable by the Parties under the Panamanian BIT may be explained by the influence of the Calvo Doctrine during negotiations.
The Calvo Doctrine, widely followed in the Caribbean, Central
when qualified foreign personnel must be obtained. ENST & WHINNEY, INTERNATIONAL SRrues: EGYr 1-2 (Feb. 1980).
13 Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. I(c), at 1227.
137 Egyptian BIT, supra note 63, protocol, pars. 1, at 947.
138 "Under international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state that creates it,
but other states need not accept that nationality if it is not based on a genuine link between
the state and the corporation." RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 216 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). If there is no "genuine link" with the state
of incorporation, a corporation may be deemed a national of its state of incorporation, of its
sielge sociale (principal place of business or management), or of the state where its shareholders reside, depending upon the reason for determining its nationality. See Note on Different Approaches to Attributing a "Nationality" to a Corporation,in STmza & VAGTS,
supra note 2, at 74-76. See also Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 4 (New Application: 1962), where the ICJ held that
Belgium, the country where the shareholders of a corporation located in Spain were nationals, could not assert a claim on behalf of the corporation against Spanish nationalization
because the corporation was incorporated in Canada and Canada had not waived its sovereign right to assert the claim.
1" The definition of investment for purposes of the Treaty includes ownership of shares
of stock. Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. I(d)(ii), at 1228. Direct or indirect equity
ownership is specifically protected from expropriation without proper compensation. Id. art.
IV, para. 2, at 1232.
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America, and South America, holds that aliens are entitled to no
greater rights than nationals and, therefore, may seek redress for
grievances only before local authorities.1 40 The Calvo Doctrine was
thus considered a major hurdle to overcome in negotiating the
Panamanian BIT.14 1 The Calvo Doctrine is ordinarily applied by
its adherents to disputes concerning expropriation; moreover, the
concept of absolute sovereignty on which the Doctrine is based14 1 is
also antithetical to other concepts embodied in a BIT.143 Nevertheless, Panama has made substantial concessions in order to accomodate the goals of this Treaty. Particularly important is Panama's
consent to the submission of investment disputes to the Additional
Facility of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility),4 which allows foreign inves10 3 LILLICH, THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-95
(1976).
141 United States Trade Representative Resumes Investment Discussions With Egypt,
Panama Talks Hit Snag, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 399, at 688, 689 (Mar. 16, 1982).
Panama was particularly concerned about relinquishing its local authority over investment
disputes to an international tribunal. Id. The dispute settlement mechanisms in the final
Treaty demonstrate that Panama overcame this reluctance in order to sign the BIT. See
infra note 144. Ratification may still be hindered, however, due to Panama's continued unwillingness to compromise the "sanctity of its tribunals." U.S.-Panama Treaty Signed, but
Problems Remain Before Ratifying, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEzKLv (BNA) 170 (Nov. 2, 1982). The
United States will delay ratification until three outstanding investment disputes with Panama are settled. Id. at 171.
1' The effect of a Calvo Clause, see infra note 145, is that the host country usurps full
sovereignty over the foreign investment and over the investor's activities in the host country. The Latin American concept of absolute sovereignty also underlies the notions that
subsoil rights lie with the sovereign and that industries operated by the state should be
closed to foreign investment. Helander, supra note 62, at 241.
14' Calvo Doctrine adherents do not believe that the host state must provide the standard
of compensation for expropriation which the Model BIT requires. See Helander, supra note
62, at 241-43. The Doctrine is also antithetical to third-party settlement of investment disputes. Id. at 241.
The Doctrine is opposed to the United States position that no individual can renounce
the rights of his government and that the United States may invoke its own sovereign rights
to intervene on behalf of its citizens because injury to a citizen constitutes injury to the
United States.

RESTATEMENT OP TE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

713(1) comment g. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). The opposition of the Calvo Doctrine to the
United States position has forced United States foreign investors to solve investment disputes in ad hoc arrangements agreeable to Latin American governments and themselves.
Helander, supra note 62, at 241.
1" Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, art. VII, para. 3(b), at 1234. Neither Panama nor
any other Latin American Calvo Doctrine adherent is a party to the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 89. In order to use the ICSID
procedures, one of the parties to the dispute must be a "Contracting State or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State."
Convention, supra note 89, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 174. "Contracting
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tors to settle disputes before an impartial tribunal rather than limiting dispute settlement to local remedies. Finally, any Calvo
Clauses ' 5 in previous investment contracts between the Panamanian government and United States investors could conceivably be
1 6
annulled by operation of this Treaty. "
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States initiative in negotiating Bilateral Investment
Treaties with developing nations should foster private participation in the development effort. The treaties which have been
signed with Panama and Egypt afford the investor rights which
were previously either nonexistent or difficult to enforce. While
these two treaties conform closely to the Model BIT, they do have
some significant differences which will affect the legal framework
for investors. Future BITs should be examined for these types of
differences before any conclusions as to their legal effect are
reached. After the Egyptian and Panamanian BITs have been rati-

State" means a state which has confirmed its previous signature of the Convention by ratification at least 30 days prior to its attempt to use the ICSID procedures. Sutherland, supra
note 44, at 382. The ICSID has constituted an Additional Facility for investment disputes
which are outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. InternationalCentre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes: Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation,Arbitration, and Fact-FindingProceedings, introductory notes, 21 I.L.M. 1443 (1982). Heribert
Golsong, Secretary-General of the ICSID, interprets article VII, para. 3(a) of the Panamanian BIT, supra note 108, at 1234, to constitute consent by the two Parties to use of the
Additional Facility. Letter of H. Golsong to J. McCarthy, 21 LL.M. 1244 (1982).
"' Calvo Clauses are inserted into contracts between alien investors and the host country
as a means of implementing the Doctrine:
The contractor and all persons who ... may be engaged in the execution of the
work under this contract. . . , shall be considered as [host state nationals] in all
matters, within the [host state) concerning the . ..fulfillment of this contract.
They shall not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the ... business connected with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce the same than
those granted by the laws of the [host state] .... They are consequently deprived of any rights as aliens, and under no conditions shall the intervention of
foreign diplomatic agents be permitted in any manner related to this contract.
Brower, supra note 46, at 70-71.
140 Panamanian BIT, supra note 10S, art. IX, at 1237-38. This article provides that the
Treaty will not derogate from any laws or investment agreements existing when the BIT
enters into force which entitle investments to treatment more favorable than that accorded
by the BIT. Because a Calvo Clause would curtail the investor's available remedies, it would
be less favorable than treatment accorded by the Treaty;, consequently, the Treaty may
supercede such a clause.
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fled and in force for several years, investors and potential investors
will have a greater understanding of their rights under this type of
treaty.
Deirdre Annette Cody

